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NY WRITER on prenatal injuries is confronted with age-old
philosophical questions regarding life. When does life begin?
Does it begin at the moment of birth? Does it begin at the
moment of conception, or at the time that the fetal heart tones are first
detected, or when the mother "feels life?" Does it begin "in contempla-
tion of law as soon as an infant is able to stir in the mother's womb?" 1
Medical answers range from the moment of conception to the moment
of birth. But even the exact time of birth itself is debatable, since upon
delivery a child may still remain for a few moments attached to the
placenta by the umbilical cord.
Some authorities and courts have deemed the fetus a living being
when the host-mother feels life; others demand that the fetal heart
tones be audible. A number of courts believe that to be "born" the
cord must be severed, for only then is the infant truly living alone.
Still others have held a fetus to be a legal "person" when such a fetus
would have a considerable chance for survival even though separated
from the mother's womb. The reasons for these inconsistencies are
patent. Medical history has recorded instances where fetuses weighing
a pound have managed to survive after no longer than twenty-four
weeks gestation.2 An excerpt from an authoritative medical textbook
demonstrates the indefiniteness of the exact length of human gestation.
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1 COOLEY, CoMMm.NTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND BY SM WILLIAM 13LACKSTONE
§ 130, at 119 (4th ed. 1899).
2 DE LEE AND GREENHILL, PRiNCU'LEs AND PRACTICE OF OBSTETRCS 96 (8th ed. 1943).
Ovulation may occur at any time. Authorities disagree as to the relation of the
discharge of the ova from the ovary to the time of menstruation, but ovulation
generally takes place about fourteen days before the onset of the next menstrual
flow. We do not know if an ovum is fertilizable when it leaves the graafian follicle
or if it requires time, and if so, how much? We do not know how long it takes
the spermatozoon to reach the ovum. Therefore, it is impossible to determine the
time of conception even when the date of the fruitful coition is certain. Further,
labor occurs often as the result of some trauma-physical or mental. Since the
beginning and the end of pregnancy are indeterminable, we cannot estimate the
exact length of . . . [gestation].8
The law governing prenatal injuries and deaths has undergone such
a marked transition that it is equivalent to almost a complete reversal
in legalistic thinking. The basic problem involved in judicial review
is whether an unborn child is a legal entity, thereby having standing
to maintain an individual cause of action. Additional problems faced
by the courts revolve around the difficulties extant in determining the
relationship between an alleged trauma and the injury to the unborn
child, and the proof of proximate cause.
In this article, I have addressed myself to the above problems from
a medical perspective, approaching the subject by outlining the past
legal history, discussing the present condition and trend of the law,
with specific emphasis on Illinois treatment, discussing prenatal in-
juries in relation to wrongful death statutes, and presenting a prog-
nosis as to the future development of prenatal litigation.
PAST HISTORY: FROM NO RECOVERY TO VIABILITY
Prior to the enlightened modern era of legalistic thinking, harm
occurring to a child en ventre sa mere4 was held not actionable, and no
right of recovery was recognized against one wrongfully inflicting
prenatal injuries. Despite the well settled doctrines of property, wills
and succession, and criminal law which considered a fetus as a distinct
CCperson" able to inherit and own property or to be the victim of a
crime, courts generally held that an unborn child was not a legal
"person," and therefore, could have no standing to maintain an action
individually or by a legal representative. An unbroken line of decisions
denied recovery for prenatal injuries primarily because a fetus was
8Id.
4 A French term descriptive of an unborn child, defined as "in its mother's womb."
BLACK'S LAW DICTiONARY 619 (4th ed. 1951).
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not considered to be a "person," and also because of the supposed
impossibility of determining proximate cause and the strong likelihood
of spurious claims.
Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northhampton stands as the first re-
corded instance wherein recovery was sought for injuries sustained
before birth.5 Suit was brought by an administrator under the Massa-
chusetts Wrongful Death Statute on behalf of a deceased infant whose
mother, at four to five months gestation,6 had fallen as a result of a
defect in a sidewalk improperly maintained by the city. The child,
although not directly injured, was not sufficiently developed to survive
the premature birth7 which ensued. Justice Holmes, rejecting the anal-
ogy between the case in issue and those cases wherein unborn infants
were recognized as existing persons for purposes of the laws of prop-
erty, succession, and criminal law, held that the unborn child was a
"part" of its mother and, having no separate existence, was not a
person within the intendment of the law.
In the Dietrich case, the infant was obviously not viable.' Although
the court did not expressly hold that a viable infant would likewise be
denied a cause of action, it did, by way of dictum, indicate that no
recovery would have been allowed even if the child had survived and
an action brought for injuries. Thereafter, courts generally accepted
Holmes' dictum as applicable to all tort actions brought on behalf of
unborn infants.'
Within a few years the second foundation case, Walker v. Great
Northern Railway Company of Ireland, was adjudicated in Ireland.'0
5138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. R. 242 (1884).
6 "The time during which a woman carries a fetus in her womb, from conception to
birth." BLAcx's LAW DICTIONARY 816 (4th ed. 1951).
7 A premature delivery occurs where pregnancy is terminated after viability, but at
least two weeks prior to the anticipated date of delivery. The exact time span of confine-
ment being largely speculative, delivery of an infant two weeks before the anticipated
date is considered to be almost normal.
sViability is the ability to live after birth. Both the medical and legal disciplines define
the word identically: "capable of living, especially capable of living outside of the uterus;
said of a fetus that has reached such a stage of development that it can live outside of
the uterus," DoRLAND's ILLUSRATED MzDicAL DICTnONARY 1689 (24th ed. 1965) ; "Capability
of living. A term used to denote the power a new-born child possesses of continuing its
independent existence," BLAcK's LAw DICTiONARY 1737 (4th ed. 1951). It is generally ac-
cepted that a fetus is not capable of independent, extrauterine existence until the twenty-
sixth week of gestation.
9 Supra note 5, at 17, 52 Am. R. at 245.
10 28 L.R. Ir. 69 (1891).
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An infant sued for prenatal injuries sustained when her mother, a train
passenger, was injured through the alleged negligence of the carrier.
Although the child was viable when the injury occurred and was born
alive, albeit deformed, after a full term gestation, recovery was denied
solely on the lack of an independent duty owed to the infant because the
carrier, having no knowledge of the plaintiff child's presence, had con-
tracted to transport only the infant's mother. The court favored the
cause of action "in the abstract," but felt that the impossibility of
proof barred the action." The court further rationalized that the legis-
lature, and not the courts, should resolve the issue:
The law is in some respects a stream that gathers accretions with time from new
relations and conditions. But it is also a landmark that forbids advance on defined
rights and engagements, and if these are to be altered, if new rights and engage-
ments are to be created, that is the province of legislation and not of decision.' 2
Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, the third landmark case, became a
guiding light by virtue of its strong dissent." An expectant mother
was injured in the hospital elevator while being brought to the delivery
room. The child, born a few days later with permanent crippling in-
juries, sued on those resultant injuries. Though there was no question
of viability, the majority of the court denied recovery based on the
Dietrich case, citing Justice Holmes' idea that the unborn child was
part of the "bowels" of the mother. Justice Boggs' dissent called
Holmes' statement illogical when applied to an infant who was viable
and capable of living independently of its mother, but implied that a
non-viable fetus would not recover and should "be regarded as but a
part of the bowels of the mother during a portion of the period of
gestation. . .. "'I The dissent became the basis for the first invasion
upon the doctrine of no recovery for prenatal injuries in the United
States. Justice Boggs declared:
It may be conceded that no case adjudicated at the common law can be found
11 "But there are instances in the law where rules of right are founded upon the inherent
and inevitable difficulty or impossibility of proof. And it is easy to see on what a bound-
less sea of speculation in evidence this new idea would launch us. What a field would be
opened to extravagance of testimony, already great enough-if Science could carry her
lamp, not over certain in its light where people have their eyes, into the unseen laboratory
of nature and could profess to reveal the causes and things that are hidden there ..
Walker v. Great Northern R.R., supra note 10, at 81.
12 Walker v. Great Northern R.R., supra note 10, at 82.
18 184 IMI. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
14 Id. at 370, 56 N.E. at 641.
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wherein a plaintiff was awarded damages for injuries inflicted upon his person
whilst in the womb of his mother. But an adjudicated case is not indispensable to
establish a right to recover under the rule of the common law .... If in delivering
a child an attending physician, acting for compensation, should wantonly or by
actionable negligence injure the limbs of the infant, and thereby cause the child,
although born alive and living, to be maimed and crippled in body or members,
it would be abhorrent to every impulse of justice or reason to deny such a child
a right of action against such a physician to recover damages for the wrongs and
injuries inflicted by such physician. . . .The law should, it seems to me, be, that
whenever a child in utero is so far advanced in a prenatal age as that, should
parturition by natural or artificial means occur at such age, such child could and
would live separable from the mother and grow into the ordinary activities of life,
and is afterward born and becomes a living human being, such child has a right
of action for any injuries wantonly or negligently inflicted upon his or her person
at such age of viability, though then in the womb of the mother.'
Justice Boggs thus believed a fetus was an independent person if it
could live independently upon the mother's death. While concurring
with the Walker view that the legislature must take the initiative
toward reform, Justice Boggs concluded that no reason existed for the
courts to wait for legislative reform, and that mere difficulty of proof
should not permit a right to be without a remedy. Nevertheless, the
cases subsequent to the Allaire decision continued to deny recovery.
In the ensuing forty-five years, ten other jurisdictions adopted the
no recovery rule, 6 basing their arguments on Dietrich. However, legal
writers criticized the Dietrich decision, and numerous minority opin-
ions and obiter dicta laid the foundation for the more enlightened
modern trend extending a cause of action to immature fetuses.
In 1916, the court in Lipps v. Milwaukee Electric Railway and Light
Company denied recovery to an unborn non-viable fetus, but implied
it would grant recovery to a viable fetus. By stating that "very cogent
reasons may be urged for a contrary rule to that of denying recovery
where the infant is viable,,"'8 the court suggested that a suit in the
15 1d. at 368, 373-74, 56 N.E. at 640, 642.
16Alabama: Stanford v. St. Louis - San Francisco Ry. Co., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566
(1926); Michigan: Newman v. Detroit, 281 Mich. 60, 274 N.W. 710 (1937); Missouri:
Buel v. United Rys. of St. Louis, 248 Mo. 126 154 S.W. 71 (1913); New Jersey: Stemmer
v. Kline, 128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A.2d 489 (1942); New York: Nugent v. Brooklyn Hts. Ry.,
154 App. Div. 667, 139 N.Y.S. 367 (1913); Ohio: Mays v. Weingarten, 82 N.E.2d 421
(Ohio 1943) ; Pennsylvania: Berlin v. J.C. Penney Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A.2d, 28 (1940);
Rhode Island: Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R.I. 169, 49 A. 704 (1901); Texas: Magnolia
Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (1935); Wisconsin: Lipp
v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 164 Wis. 272, 159 N.W. 916 (1916).
17 164 Wis. 272, 159 N.W. 916 (1916).
'
81d. at 276, 159 N.W. at 917.
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name of a viable child could be sustained. This dictum added impetus
to the recognition of an unborn child as being in esse and was the fore-
runner of the eventual change in the viability rule.
As late as 1951, the "non-separate, legal person rule" was followed
by an American court in Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Company,19 wherein the
court held that an unborn child, although viable, is part of the mother
until birth, and in the realm of tort law, has no separate judicial
existence.
PRESENT HISTORY: FROM VIABILITY TO PRE-VIABILITY
A precipitous shift in judicial attitude was initiated in 1946, when
the federal district court in the District of Columbia allowed an action
based on medical malpractice, wherein the negligence of an obstetrician
caused direct injury to a viable child."0 For the first -time without the
benefit of a statute2 ' an infant prevailed in an action to recover for
prenatal injuries. The court denied the inseparability of the fetus,
citing as an example the instances in which living children are taken
by Caesarian section from dead mothers, and asserted that the law,
not being "arid and sterile," must maintain the same progress as
medical science.
Three years later the Ohio Supreme Court confronted the identical
problem in William v. Marion Rapid Transit22 and upheld the right of
a surviving child to bring suit, injured while en ventre sa mere by the
tortious conduct of another. Seventeen other jurisdictions have subse-
quently recognized the capacity of the infant to sue, or in the event of
death, the right of his legal representative to sue under the wrongful
death statute of the particular state. 3 Even Massachusetts, the bastion
19155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951).
20Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
21 Prior to this time a few decisions allowed recovery based on specific statutes. But
the cases barely caused a ripple in judicial or legislative thought denying recovery to an
infant for prenatal injuries. See Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So.2d 352 (La. Ct. App. 1923);
Kline v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa. D.&C. 227 (1924); Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629,
92 P.2d 678 (1939).
22152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949).
23 Connecticut: Tursi v. New England Windsor Co., 19 Conn. Supp. 242, 111 A.2d 14
(1955); Delaware: Worgan v. Greggo and Ferrara, Inc., 50 Del: 258, 128 A.2d 557 (1956) ;
Georgia: Tucker v. Carmichael & Sons, Inc., 208 Ga. 201, 65 S.E.2d 909 (1951) ; Illinois:
Amann v. Faidy, 415 11. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953); Rodriguez v. Patti, 415 Ill. 496,
114 N.E.2d 721 (1953); Iowa: Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Iowa 1960);
Kentucky: Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. App. 1955); Maryland: Damasiewicz
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of the no recovery rule as enunciated in Dietrich, allowed recovery in
Keyes v. Construction Service, Inc. for the death of a child caused
by prenatal injuries.2 4
As a further extension of the new doctrine, liability for injury to a
non-viable infant was first recognized in Kelly v. Gregory.25 Subse-
quently, five more jurisdictions allowed recovery to a non-viable infant,
including Illinois. 26 The three month old fetus in the Kelly case was
injured by the negligent operation of an automobile. The court aban-
doned the viability rule in favor of a biologic-separability theory,
stating that separability commences at the time of conception when
the fetus becomes a separate organism, which characteristic is not
destroyed though the infant, if separated prior to reaching the viable
stage of development, may not survive.
In Smith v. Brennan and Gallbraiths, the court, in allowing recovery
to a non-viable child, stated that, "Medical authorities have long rec-
ognized that a child is in existence .from the moment of conception,
and not merely a part of its mother's body.' 27 Such phrases as "[i] f
. . . [biological] processes can be disrupted resulting in harm to the
child when born, it is immaterial whether before birth the child is
considered a person in being' 28 and "[w]hether viable or not at the
time of the injury, the child sustains the same harm after birth, and
therefore should be given the same opportunity for redress"" raised a
v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951); Minnesota: Verkennes v. Corniea, 229
Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949); Mississippi: Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So.2d
434 (1954); Missouri: Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 258 S.W.2d 577 (1953);New
Hampshire: Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957); New Jersey:
Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960); New York: Woods v. Lancet,
303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951); Oregon: Mallison v. Pomeroy, 205 Ore. 690, 291
P.2d 225 (1955); Pennsylvania: Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960);
South Carolina: Hall v. Murphy, 236 S.C. 257, 113 S.E.2d 790 (1960) ; Washington: First
Nat'l. Bank v. Rankin, 59 Wash. Rep. 2d 288, 367 P.2d 835 (1962).
24340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960). But interestingly the Court concluded:
"There is no need to reverse the Dietrich decision which doubtless was right when ren-
dered but we recognize that in view of modern precedent its application should be limited
to cases where the facts are essentially the same." Id. at 637, 165 N.E.2d at 915.
25 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953).
26 Hornbuckle v. Planatation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956) ; Daley
v. Meier, 33 Ill. App. 2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691 (1961) ; Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483,
147 A.2d 108 (1958); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960); Sinkler v.
Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960).
2731 N.J. 353, 362, 157 A.2d 497, 502 (1960).
281d. at 364, 157 A.2d at 503.
29 Id. at 367, 157 A.2d at 504.
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further question as to whether the age of the infant at the time of the
wrongful act should ever be given controlling consideration in allowing
recovery.30
Relying on the Smith case, the court in Sinkler v. Kneale stated:
As for the notion that the child must have been viable when the injuries were re-
ceived, which has claimed the attention of several of the states, we regard it as
having little to do with the basic right to recover, when the foetus is regarded as
having existence as a separate creature from the moment of conception.8 1
As supporting arguments, the above cited courts claimed that im-
proved medical care lengthened the period during which the fetus
could survive separated from its mother, although in fact the time is
by no means more susceptible of medical proof. The courts further
felt that the grave injustice of denying recovery applied whether the
injury occurred in the third or eighth month of pregnancy.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRENATAL RECOVERY IN ILLINOIS
Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital8 2 remained the law in Illinois and in
1939 was reaffirmed in Smith v. Luckhardt, wherein the court refused
to take action on the ground that legislative reform was the only
instrument of change in this area.8"
In 1952, two appellate court decisions again upheld the Allaire
doctrine. The first case involved a negligence action brought on behalf
of an infant who allegedly died as a result of injuries sustained in an
auto accident caused by defendant's negligence; 84 the other case was
30 The court remarked: "We see no reason for denying recovery for a prenatal injury
because it occurred before the infant was capable of separate existence. In the first place,
age is not the sole measure of viability, and there is no real way of determining in a
borderline case whether or not a fetus was viable at the time of injury, unless it was
immediately born." Id. On the issue of age, see Note, Extension of Prenatal Injury Doctrine
to Nonviable Injants, 11 DEPAUL L. REv. 361 (1962).
81401 Pa. 267, 273, 164 A.2d 93, 96 (1960).
82 Supra note 13.
83 299 111. App. 100, 112, 19 N.E.2d 446, 451 (1939). Plaintiff's brief in Sinith stated its
contention well:" 'The fundamental rights of personal security and the pursuit of happi-
ness, out-weigh in importance the transient rights of property, and that an unborn child,
especially after it becomes quick, viable and alive, and when the destruction of the life of
the mother does not necessarily end its existence, and at an age when if separated pre-
maturely from its mother, by artificial means, it would be so far matured that it would
live and grow naturally, such a child has a right to recover for injuries sustained by
negligence and malpractice.'" Id. at 102, 19 N.E.2d at 447.
84 Amann v. Faidy, 348 Ill. App. 37, 107 N.E.2d 868 (1952).
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a negligence action for injuries sustained in a fall by an unborn infant's
mother. 5 However, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed both cases,3"
thereby changing the law in Illinois which had existed since 1900 to
conform with Justice Boggs' dissent enunciated in Allaire, which
allowed recovery if viability existed.
Eight years later in Daley v. Meier, 7 Illinois adopted the holding
of Kelly v. Gregory,3" thereby joining four other jurisdictions in ex-
panding liability for injuries to pre-viable, unborn persons.39 Action
was brought on behalf of a child born mentally retarded and physically
underdeveloped. Plaintiff alleged that defendant's negligent operation
of her automobile caused injury to the child, then only in the first
month of gestation. The appellate court reversed the trial court's dis-
missal of the action, holding that an infant who survives birth can
maintain an action to recover for prenatal injuries, medically provable
as resulting from the negligence of another, even if the child has not
reached the state of a viable fetus at the time of the injury. One year
later in Sana v. Brown,40 the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed Daley v.
Meier by holding improper the dismissal of an automobile personal
injury complaint as to a child-plaintiff born four and one-half months
after the accident, on the ground that plaintiff was not viable at
the time of the accident.
The most recent Illinois case to date, Zepeda v. Zepeda, involved a
most unusual action wherein an "adulterine bastard" attempted the
creation of a new tort by seeking damages from his putative father.4"
Plaintiff's theory was that as an illegitimate child he was deprived of
a normal home and of equality with legitimate children. Although
recognizing the plaintiff's right to preserve family life and his right to
protect that interest against outside disturbances, the court refused to
recognize such a "new tort" involving a "cause of action for wrongful
life."142 But the court did affirm the more recent thinking regarding
35 Rodriguez v. Patti, 348 I1. App. 322, 108 N.E.2d 830 (1952).
36Amann v. Faidy, 415 111. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953); Rodriguez v. Patti, 415
IM. 496, 114 N.E.2d 721 (1953).
37Supra note 26.
88 Supra note 25.
3 9 Supra note 26.
4035 Ill. App. 2d 425, 183 N.E.2d 187 (1962).
4141 IIl. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963).
42 id. at 259, 190 N.E.2d at 858.
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torts to unborn children and the non-viable child. The court reasoned:
The law of torts has been hesitant in recognizing what medical science has long
known, that life begins at the moment of conception, and what theology has longer
taught, that from the moment of conception every human being has rights of a
human person .... 43 The case at bar seems to be the natural result of the present
course of the law permitting actions for physical injury ever closer to the moment
of conception. In point of time it goes just a little further. The significance of this
course to us is this: if recovery is to be permitted an infant injured one month
after conception, why not if injured one week after, one minute after, or at the
moment of conception? It is inevitable that the date will be further retrogressed.
How can the law distinguish the day to day development of life? If there is human
life, proved by subsequent birth, then that human life has the same rights at the
time of conception as it has at any time thereafter. There cannot be absolutes in
the minute to minute progress of life from sperm and ovum to cell, to embryo to
foetus, to child. 44
The court then embarked upon a dissertation of the possibilities
that could ensue. It asked: could a cause of action exist if the wrong-
ful conduct took place before conception, or could the defendant be
held accountable if the tortious act was completed before the plaintiff
was conceived? The court answered in the affirmative, drawing from
Justice Holmes' statement in the Dietrich case that there can be "a
conditional prospective liability in tort to one not yet in being. '43 It
then recited three examples in which such a situation could occur:
first, a manufacturer's liability for burns sustained by an infant after
birth caused by an improperly functioning space heater produced
before the infant was conceived; second, the liability of a drug manu-
facturer for an inadequately tested drug, which though beneficial for
the purpose intended, was harmful when taken by a woman in early
stages of pregnancy, thereby causing anomalies and developmental
fetal defects; and third, where the wrongful act takes place before
conception, but the injury attaches at conception, thermont4clear ra-
diation with its effect on prospective future parents could cause muta-
tions and other physical and mental defects. Specifically, the court
asked:
If a child is born malformed or an imbecile because of the genetic effect on his
father and mother of a negligently or intentionally caused atomic explosion, will he
be denied recovery because he was not in being at the time of explosion? 46
48d. at 248, 190 N.E.2d at 852.
44 Id. at 249, 190 N.E.2d at 853.
45 Id. at 250, 190 N.E.2d at 853.
46 1d. at 251, 190 N.E.2d at 854.
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The court further concluded that an injury resulting from a wrong
committed before conception need not be physical. Thus, in effect, the
Zepeda case established strong precedent for future fetal-infant neg-
ligence actions, clearly set forth present Illinois law on the matter, and
will most likely give rise to subsequent litigation on the hypotheticals
it presented.
PRENATAL INJURIES AND WRONGFUL DEATH
At common law, no action existed for wrongful death. Early courts
considered the action a personal one; and upon the death of the de-
cedent the action terminated and did not survive to the decedent's
heirs or representatives." Today, all states, including Illinois, have
statutes allowing certain survivors to bring an action for wrongful
death. Until recently, these statutes were not construed to allow an
action for the wrongful death of an unborn child because the child was
not considered a valid legal, separate, and existing individual. Although
some jurisdictions have apparently receded from this position, there is
little unanimity in this area of prenatal injuries, because of the diver-
gent language employed in the various wrongful death and survival
statutes, and because recovery by a stillborn is determined by the
construction of these statutes in the various jurisdictions.
It is universally accepted that if an action for wrongful death is to
be maintained, the act must be of such character as would have sup-
ported an action by the deceased for his injuries had he survived. This
proviso is explicit in most wrongful death statutes; 41 if the deceased
never had a cause of action, none would accrue under a statute con-
taining such a condition. Except for a few jurisdictions, the courts
have limited recovery for prenatal injuries resulting in death to those
infants born alive. Many of these courts have clung to the anachro-
nistic viability rule often coupled with the newer survival or live birth
requirement.4
In Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Company, the Nebraska Supreme Court
4 7 Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 STAN. L. REv. 1043, 1052-62 (1965).
48 See, e.g., ILL. RPV. STAT. ch. 70, § 1 (1967); TENN. CODE ANx. 20-607 (1956).
49 Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 268 P.2d 178 (1954); Drabbels v. Skelly
Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A. 140
(1964); In Re Logan's Estate, 3 N.Y. 2d 800, 144 N.E.2d 644 (1957); Gay v. Thompson,
266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966); Hall v. Murphy, 236 S.C. 257, 113 S.E.2d 790
(1960); Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221 (1958).
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adhered to the questionable judicial rationale that an unborn child is
part of the mother until birth.' As such, the fetus had no judicial
existence, and therefore, could not maintain an action at common law
for injuries sustained while in the womb. The court refused to support
the proposition that a child born dead was a "person" insofar as the law
of torts was concerned. Since no cause of action accrued to the stillborn
for injuries received before birth, none survived under the wrongful
death statute. Similarly, the court in Hogan v. McDaniel asserted that
the Tennessee Legislature had not intended the unborn child to be
considered a person. 1 This tribunal concluded that, "The biolqgical
fact that life begins at the moment of conception . . . is a pure fiction
of the law ... and does not create a right of action at law." 52 In Norman
v. Murphy,53 a California court concluded that the action was not
maintainable because an unborn minor child was held not to be a minor
person within the meaning of the statute, which allowed an action for
the wrongful death of a non-minor person or of a person who leaves
surviving him either a spouse or children or parents.
While the Massachusetts court in Keyes v. Construction Service,
Inc.54 "effectively" reversed the Dietrich decision, allowing recovery
for prenatal injuries, an implied condition of survival was engrafted
on the recovery in death actions. The Keyes court stated that the law
of Massachusetts should harmonize with that of the growing body of
law of other states which have in principle adopted the rule that when
an unborn child who has become a separable living entity is injured by
the wanton or negligent act of another liability attaches after a ful-
fillment of the implied condition that the child be born alive.
In a New Jersey55 and a North Carolina decision,56 the struggle to
prevent the maintenance of wrongful death actions for infants not
born alive is demonstrated in the first impression determinations ren-
dered by the two separate courts. Both courts argued that it is im-
possible to predict the pecuniary benefit to the survivors of an unborn
50 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951).
51204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221 (1958).
52Id. at 243, 319 S.W.2d at 224.
53124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 268 P.2d 178 (1954).
5 4 Supra note 24.
55 Graf v. Taggert, supra note 49.
6 Gay v, Thompson, supra note 49.
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child within the meaning of the statutes, in the absence of evidence as
to the child's capabilities and potentialities. The recent North Caro-
lina case of Stetson v. Easterling upheld the law denying recovery in
that jurisdiction.57 An action was brought for an infant's death from
brain damage caused by the alleged negligence of a physician in deliv-
ering the child. The court held that under that state's death statute
negligence alone, without pecuniary loss resulting from death, would
not create a cause of action. The administrator failed to show that,
had the child lived, he would have had earning capacity; and the court
refused to estimate or predict what the child could have earned. In
addition, the Michigan Appellate Court, while noting recent decisions
to the contrary in other jurisdictions, nevertheless ruled the state's
wrongful death act inapplicable to a stillborn child. 8
Precedent was reversed when Minnesota, in Verkennes v. Corniea,59
became the first state to allow a wrongful death proceeding for a still-
born infant. After noting that no issue of viability was involved because
the infant died during delivery, the court concluded:
[A] cause of action arises when death is caused by the wrongful act or omission
of another, and the personal representative of the decedent may maintain such ac-
tion on behalf of the next of kin of decedent. It seems too plain for argument that
where independent existence is possible and life is destroyed through a wrongful act
a cause of action arises under the statutes cited. 60
Subsequently, other jurisdictions authorized such actions.6
Seven years later, a viable child killed in an automobile accident
was deemed a person within the meaning of the wrongful death statute
in Kentucky.62 An Iowa Federal District Court" in 1960 allowed re-
covery, holding that in view of the overwhelming trend since the early
1950's toward allowing recovery for prenatal injuries to viable infants,
57274 N.C. 152, 161 S.E.2d 531 (1968).
58 Goodrich v. Moore, 8 Mich. App. 725, 155 N.W.2d 247 (1967).
59 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
60 Id. at 370, 38 N.W.2d at 841.
61 Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Iowa 1960) ; Gorke v. LeClerc, 23 Conn. Supp.
256, 181 A.2d 448 (1962) ; Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., 50 Del. 258, 128 A.2d 557
(1956) ; Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955) ; Hale v. Manion, 189
Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955);
Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So.2d 434 (1954); Polinquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H.
104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957); Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959).
62 Mitchell v. Couch, supra note 61.
63 Wendt v. Lillo, supra note 61.
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the Iowa Supreme Court, if presented with the question, would hold
that plaintiffs could maintain the instant action.
The Ohio Supreme Court in 1959 decided that a viable unborn child
is a person and though stillborn possesses as valid a cause of action as
one born alive and dying subsequently. 4 The court concluded it was
unable to reconcile the proposition that if death occurred after birth, a
cause of action existed, but that if death occurred before birth, no
cause of action existed. "[L]ogic requires recognition of causes of
action for the deaths of both, or for neither." '6
The Connecticut Supreme Court, in 196206 and in 1966,67 adopted
the same holding and rationale. The court concluded that to deny such
an action for injuries to a viable fetus was both harsh and illogical,
that medical science obviated much of the difficulty of causation, and
that fraudulent claims are much less probable than they once were.
Later it will be evident that medical science falls short of the omnipo-
tence so bestowed upon it by the Connecticut court.
In 1964, Todd v. Sandedge Construction Company68 established the
logical rationale that a death action should not be barred where a child
died before birth, because such a distinction would be arbitrary and
unjust; for the greater the harm, the better the chance of immunity,
and thus the tortfeasor could foreclose his own liability. Once a viable
fetus is accorded the status of a person in esse,69 a cause of action au-
tomatically arises, for if death had not ensued, the child would have
been entitled to maintain an action to recover damages.
The viability rule remains very much an issue in wrongful death
actions. Even in jurisdictions allowing proceedings on behalf of still-
born infants the viability necessity still applies and requires, as an
indispensable prerequisite to the suit, that the fetus be viable when the
injury causing fetal death or initiating the pathology ultimately causing
fetal death occurs. No cases have been recorded awarding damages
64 Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E. 2d 106 (1959).
65Id. at 434, 167 N.E.2d at 108.
66 Gorke v. LeClerc, supra note 61.
67 Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358, 224 A.2d 406 (1966).
68341 F.2d 75 (2nd Cir. 1964). Another federal decision, Gullborg v. Rizzo, 331 F.2d
557 (3rd Cir. 1964), rejected the "live birth" doctrine and allowed recovery for a still-
birth.
69 "In being. Actually existing. Distinguished from in posse, which means 'That which
is not, but may be." BLA K's LAw DiCTIONARY 894 (4th ed. 1951).
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against a tortfeasor for causing the death before birth of a non-viable
fetus.
PROGNOSIS
A clinician in the determination of an accurate medical prognosis
must amass all the pertinent medical facts available in the past and
present history, add to it the objective physical findings and laboratory
data, sift this information through a mental process honed by exhaus-
tive hours of scientific training and current readings, and conclude
with a diagnosis. Correspondingly, a determination of what may tran-
spire in the future, judicially, must also undergo a similarly complicated
process.
Although it may appear that changes in the law of prenatal injuries
have proceeded at a snail's pace, especially considering the lack of
consistency and conformity in the philosophical, moral, and natural
laws concerning the meaning of life itself, it is fortunate indeed that any
advancements have been wrought at all by the constant struggle of the
courts in their attempts to provide a remedy for every wrong. For many
years following the foundation cases of Dietrich,7 Walker,7 and
Allaire,72 the courts wrestled with the questions initially proposed:
What is life? When does life begin? At first, denying the concepts of
natural law, morality, and philosophy, the courts were leery ,to cause a
change, not so much for the philosophical reasons enunciated, but actu-
ally because of the practical difficulty in proving such a claim. Then
began a tortuous but steady return to the immutable natural law and
moral principle from which the early cases had departed, that:
The viable foetus does not materialize out of inanimate matter at the moment of
viability any more than the living infant materialized out of cosmic dust at the
moment of birth.78
Initially, as a matter of convenience, a child in the womb was dealt
with as part of the mother, and the law was settled against the benifi-
cence of what was construed to be an artificial rule of liability for pre-
natal injuries. Courts considered rights allowed to and for unborn
70Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northhampton, 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. R. 242 (1884).
71 Walker v. Great Northern Ry., 28 L.R. Ir. 69 (1881).
72 Alaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
73 Comment, Prenatal Injuries and the Nonviable Infant, 3 DEPAuL L. Rav. 257, 267
(1954).
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persons as being mere legal fictions, since there was no scientific proof
that such persons were living things. Then, ostensibly in the light of
scientific advancements, but more likely in order to bring tort law into
harmony with other branches of the law, courts allowed causes of action
brought on behalf of viable fetuses. Adhering to the legal axiom that
the law will be what the law should be, the viability rule met increasing
resistance, not only because of the recognition by medical authorities
that an unborn child is a distinct biological entity from the time of
conception, but in large measure because of the inability of science to
provide practical answers.
Medicine has not reached a stage, as some courts have concluded,
where all the answers to legal fact issues are available. Several exam-
ples will suffice to point up medical science's inability to be omniscient.
Insofar as the issue of viability is concerned, the exact date of con-
ception and the exact age of the fetus are medically impossible to
determine.74 Furthermore, the age of a fetus is not the sole measure of
its viability.75 Older fetuses may die, while younger fetuses may survive.
Certainty of viability could only be achieved if the infant is born
shortly after the injury. It is more than likely that the viability rule
will be abandoned and that ultimately a plaintiff need merely prove
the existence of pregnancy to prosecute a claim for fetal injuries. Even
then, problems of medical proof will continue to plague judiciaries in
the future when adjudicating prenatal litigation.
To the laity, the diagnosis of pregnancy is routine, yet physicians
are often perplexed in attempting to confirm such condition. Many
women do not menstruate regularly, and thus their days of actual fer-
tility cannot be pinpointed. No physician can clinically diagnose preg-
nancy with any degree of certainty until the sixth week following
conception. Laboratory tests do not become positive until two weeks
after the first missed menstrual period, and even then there is signi-
ficantly less than one hundred per cent accuracy.7 These uncertain
diagnoses raise grave problems as to matters of proof in prenatal per-
sonal injury and wrongful death actions. Where, in a wrongful death
proceeding, a woman delayed in her cycle suffers an injury causing
74 See supra note 2.
75 Courts have taken judicial notice of this medical fact. See Smith v. Brennan, supra
notes 27 & 30.
76 GaREE'HUL, OBSTETRICS 137 (12th ed. 1960).
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excessive bleeding, the submission of the decidual tissue passed would
be the only absolute proof of pregnancy.
The proof of the necessary causal connection between the miscon-
duct alleged and the resultant injury is crucial, but may be virtually
impossible to establish. Yet, mere difficulty in proving facts is an un-
sound reason for halting attempts at proof. Faced with a hypothetical
question of whether a trauma, no matter how slight, caused an injury,
a medical witness could not in all candor deny that the trauma might
or could have such an effect. Yet, there is very little medical authority
to support claims that trauma to the mother will cause injury to the
fetus other than its premature abortion (or birth). Because of nature's
protective barrier, the bag of waters, only catastrophic outside forces
can affect the fetus. Further, if trauma-caused damage is to occur, it
must take place in the first trimester of pregnancy while the fetus is
in its formative stage.77 In addition, what a doctor may consider a
medically "proximate cause" may not in legal theory be an actionable
"cause of action." However, advances in medical science have demon-
strated that experienced physicians can reliably relate many prenatal
conditions to later development. It has become well recognized that a
fetus deprived of oxygen, whether due to uterine bleeding or circula-
tory arrest resulting from trauma, shock, or chemical interference, has
a strong possibility of emerging with abnormality. 8 In another area,
the relation between X-rays and prenatal defects has long been ac-
knowledged, as has maternal exposure to certain viral diseases such
as rubella (German measles) and varicella (chicken pox). Again, the
noxious influences, if they are to cause fetal damage, must come into
contact with the embryo early to arrest whatever formative phase of
development is then in progress.79 The periods of active differentia-
tion of the sensory organs occur at different times in embryonic de-
velopment. The eye differentiates between the fifth and eighth week
of development, and the cochlea, or organ for hearing, between the
77 "Modern embryology has shown that the disturbances of normal growth responsible
for abnormalities must have occurred in the early stages of embryonic development....
Similar chronological considerations dispose of all but a minute fraction of cases where
physical trauma to the pregnant woman has been alleged to produce foetal abnormal-
ities." MORRISON, FOETAL AND NEo-FETAL PATHOLOGY 15 (2nd ed. 1963).
78 Recently a substantial settlement was negotiated in Illinois on behalf of a child born
with severe and permanent brain damage incurred as a result of cerebral anoxia caused
by a cardiac arrest in the mother during labor following an allegedly negligent adminis-
tration of caudal block anesthesia. Circuit Court, Cook County, No. 66L67.
79 MORRISON, supra note 77, at 21.
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seventh and tenth week. In the cataract following rubella, the mean
period of maternal infection corresponds to a fetal age of 1.17 months,
and in deafness 2.17 months.8" The developmental age at which a dis-
turbed embryological process could produce the anomaly discovered
should agree with the actual time of operation of the alleged environ-
mental disturbance.
Causation will be a particularly perplexing issue in drug-caused
prenatal injuries. There are thousands of therapeutic medicines com-
monly used and prescribed in the ethical medical world that, according
to the PDR,8'1 are contra-indicated during pregnancy. Should a woman
bearing a malformed child as a result of using such drugs, when she
was not known to be pregnant at the time of the purchase, be allowed
a cause of action against the prescriber, or a product liability suit
against the manufacturer? Should the prescriber, or vendor of the drug,
be impressed with the duty either to inquire or establish the existence
of pregnancy before such a drug is prescribed or sold?
It appears relatively certain that efforts to prove the causal relation
of the drug Thalidomide to congenital malformation will be upheld in
the "Thalidomide" trials in West Germany.82 This will be a great
victory for proponents arguing the necessity for greater clinical and
therapeutic research before putting drugs on the common market. An
unusually large number of limb deformities, heretofore rare, have
been reported following the use of the hypnotic drug by mothers be-
tween the fourth and eighth week of pregnancy. 88
As a final problem, expanding medical science will in the future
give rise to first impression prenatal litigation in two particular areas.
Research scientists have been successful in determining, prior to birth,
both the sex of an infant and certain genetic disorders and blood in-
compatibilities by tapping and examining the amniotic fluid through a
procedure known as amniocentesis.84 Such a procedure could initiate
80MolIsoN, supra note 77, at 21.
8 Physicians are supplied with an up to date compendium of all drugs produced and
manufactured called the PDR (Physician's Desk Reference), which designates the chem-
ical nature of drugs, their actions, indications, contra-indications, and therapeutic dosages.
82See AMA News, March 24, 1969, at p. 1, col. 1 (An American Medical Associa-
tion Publication).
83 MomusoN, supra note 77, at 23, 400.
84 The amnion is the bag of waters: "the sac that encloses the fetus and forms the
innermost fetal membrane, forming a sheath for the umbilical cord." DoaIAND's ILLUs-
TRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 69 (24th ed. 1965).
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a process resulting in a malformation of a fetus from an infection
negligently introduced into the bag of waters. Secondly, medical tech-
nology has gone beyond artificial insemination, which has already led
to legal complications, and, in investigating the DNA molecule, is
gradually nearing the day when human life will be artificially synthe-
sized.
Eventually all jurisdictions will allow recovery for prenatal injuries,
eliminating forever the viability requirement. And though the change
may not be as immediate, the wrongful death statutes will be construed
to likewise sustain a cause of action for deaths occuring as a result of
prenatal injuries, abrogating the viability rule and eliminating the
necessity for live birth.
As medical science discovers new causal relationships or negates those
previously accepted, litigation may be expected to incorporate these
advances. Not far off is the possibility of establishing a medico-legal
tie between maternal emotional distress and prenatal disability. These
cases and those to come will demonstrate the willingness and the
ability of the law to adapt to life situations and to scientific realities.
Principles must be derived which are rational in relation to present
medical knowledge and which will remain so with further advances in
medical science. But should the courts be reluctant to translate the
medical realities into legal principles we shall again tragically witness
a medical jurisprudence falling decades behind its scientific counter-
part.
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